First Responders to a Sneak Attack
By Frank J. Cilluffo; Thomas I. Herlihy

Terrorism is, of course, a world and national problem, one to which the federal government has devoted a great deal of attention. But it is also a very local thing. Consider:

A chemical warfare agent released in downtown Washington would likely result in immediate casualties, with a large and growing number of contaminated victims. There would be a real concern to limit further chemical exposure and minimize secondary cross-contamination. The window of opportunity would be measured in minutes, not hours. Emergency rescue personnel would be needed immediately to administer first aid, identify the chemical agent, decontaminate victims for safe transport to area hospitals, administer lifesaving antidotes, deal with the dead, isolate the contaminated area and evacuate downwind areas.

This initial emergency response would not, however, involve federal or military forces. It would consist of "first responders": local fire, police and emergency medical personnel. The fire department, which has limited ability to operate in chemically contaminated areas, would be challenged to undertake the rescue of victims while attempting to identify the chemical substance used so that appropriate medical care could be undertaken. The huge task of decontaminating masses of victims also would have to be undertaken by the fire department, with emergency medical personnel providing triage, treatment and transportation after victims had been decontaminated.

The police would have a key role in establishing a controlled perimeter around the affected area while conducting searches for secondary and tertiary terrorist devices. They would be called on to coordinate street closings and help transport victims while also attempting to preserve the crime scene and gather evidence.

The staff at hospital emergency rooms would have to prepare for an onslaught of patients while at the same time acting to prevent contamination and forced shutdown of their own facilities because of contaminated victims coming in on their own to seek help. Assistance from surrounding jurisdictions would be requested and would involve hazardous-material and support teams being called on to assist in the mass decontamination of victims and secondary identification of chemical agents. More ambulance units would be used to treat and transport the potentially large number of victims.

The first wave of outside support would be the regional Metropolitan Medical Strike Team, which would provide mass decontamination equipment, pharmaceuticals, specialized detection equipment and trained and equipped medical, hazardous-material and support personnel. It is important to note that while this regional response team was outfitted using federal funds, it is largely composed of off-duty local fire, police and emergency medical personnel.

The second wave would involve highly trained and equipped federal and specialized military forces such as the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force and the Army's Technical Escort Unit. But these units, which are extremely valuable when they are prepositioned, as they were during the last presidential inauguration and the State of the Union address, would be of limited value in a no-notice terrorist attack. The North Carolina-based Chemical Biological Incident Response Force would in all probability arrive after the last viable victim had been removed from the scene.

Moreover, terrorism by its nature extends the battlefield to incorporate all of society. And as the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City revealed, terrorists often take the path of least resistance and strike when and where least expected.

The task of mitigating a chemical warfare agent terrorist attack in the District of Columbia would be an overwhelming and extensive operation. Federal and military assets, all of which have an important role in these types of events, would prove to be indispensable, and their value cannot be overestimated. But it would be extremely difficult to marshal and deploy these assets rapidly in the critical rescue phase of an unannounced chemical attack, given the severely compressed time constraints.

Basically, even in the nation's capital, the battle will be either won or lost by the first responders. And yet, in a biological incident, their roles are not now clear-cut.

One key program that appreciates the role of the first responders is the Department of Defense's Domestic Preparedness Program. Originally prescribed in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act -- spearheaded by Sens. Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar and Pete Domenici -- the program's aim is to train and educate the first responders in 120 selected cities across the country about chemical and biological response concerns. Similar efforts are progressing on the House side under the leadership of Rep. Curt Weldon. The Washington area first responders received this needed training in January.

This federal recognition should be supported by funding so that specialized equipment and protective gear can be purchased and expanded training opportunities undertaken. Those involved in local response also need greater access to intelligence data and warnings that affect their communities as well as to new and better equipment -- as it is developed -- for monitoring and detecting chemical and biological substances. The barriers to acquiring and using military-type pharmaceutical antidotes for chemical warfare agent exposure must be removed.

Nothing less than a seamless integration among all entities at the federal, state and local levels responsible for antiterrorism efforts needs to be achieved. This requires reexamining how we as a nation perceive national security and making sure that all of the proper parties have a seat at the policy planning table.

Frank J. Cilluffo is a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Thomas I. Herlihy is a battalion chief with the D.C. Fire Department and serves as a hazardous-materials chief.

The Washington Post
June 26, 1998
Friday, Final Edition
OP-ED; Pg. A27