Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures

Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo

Director, Russian Organized Crime Task Force
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee
Committee on National Security
U.S. House of Representatives

October 1, 1997

Thank you.

First, I would like to note that organized crime and corruption are not unique to Russia, of course, but what is unique is the fact that they are a nuclear superpower, and instability coinciding with nuclear weapons can lead to a lethal combination, as we well know.

I also think it is important to recognize that our report looks at Russian organized crime as more than simply a law enforcement challenge. It does not fit into a neat little paradigm, as did the American Cosa Nostra and a number of other conventional crime families.

This phenomenon endangers the still fragile reform and democratization process in Russia. It fosters uncertainty and instability in nuclear security and safeguard issues, and while Russian exports of legitimate goods have remained stagnant, the export of crime continues to flourish. Currently, they have formed alliances with their criminal counterparts in 50 countries, 200 large organizations, 26 cities in the United States.

It must be perceived as a national security priority, as we have all referenced here, but we need to truly bring to bear all of our government's multidisciplinary assets. We simply cannot afford to be asleep at the switch. The stakes are obviously too high.

To put it into perspective, the stranglehold on Russian crime in Russian society is immense. Crime is truly usurping the state's authority to resolve legal disputes. Unable to depend on overburdened courts or corrupt courts, one is forced to turn to crime groups, or kryshas, rooftops, for adjudication. The criminals, on the other hand, do brutally enforce their own criminal code, settling everything from parking tickets to major business disputes.

Once ingrained into the Russian ethos, this cannot be eradicated overnight. That is precisely why our report stresses the need to support a process, as opposed to individuals. An independent judiciary insulated from corruption and politics is crucial. This is not an issue of simply more laws on the books, it is an issue of professionalizing a bureaucracy and an issue of political will.

The fiscal crisis in Russia, of course, is undermining urgent maintenance of nuclear command systems and is weakening security and safeguards of nuclear weapons.

A former army general and current Duma member, whom you referenced earlier, General Rokhlin, recently stated that the Russian strategic nuclear forces were nearing extinction for want of funds for maintenance. Both officers and ranks are unpaid, unfed, and unhappy. In this atmosphere the prospect for a criminal diversion of nuclear materials or an unauthorized and perhaps even an accidental nuclear weapons launch is at an all-time high, in my eyes; perhaps not as apocalyptic of a threat as it used to be, but the likelihood of a nuclear event is greater today than it was during the cold war.

That said, it is obvious that Russian MPC&A, or materiels protection control and accountability, should be a national priority. It should not be perceived as charity, but rather to enhance our own safety. It is in the world's interest to assure that Russian facilities and weapons are secure at the source itself. It makes sense for all the reasons we have heard earlier today. Preventing, deterring, and in my eyes compelling terrorism, which is a subject for a different time, different place, especially WMD terrorism or weapons of mass destruction terrorism, must be a national priority and foremost national security priority.

Revamping our national capability, and we heard from Ms. Gordon-Hagerty that we do have quite a robust capability in terms of neutralizing and rendering WMD devices safely, is critical. But should prevention fail—and we must not forget that neutralization is based upon timely intelligence and warning, which we may not get—unfortunately, prevention may not always be possible, or may currently be too late, as we stressed in our first report.

Though another issue, I think it is imperative to recognize the chem-bio threat, which in terms of likelihood is probably greater than nuclear. In terms of infrastructure, you don't need a major infrastructure. Procurement or production is not too difficult, expensive; multiple methods for delivery, few signatures to provide early warning. This is something that should also be given a lot of attention. And I know, Mr. Chairman, that you are focusing on this issue. I think it is imperative to empower our States, as you referenced, to relook at or reexamine how we perceive national security, so at the State and local level and at the first responder level we are able to deal with not just the neutralization issue, but most importantly, the consequence management issue, mitigating the deadly effects. And I think that publicly exercising such a capability would serve as a good deterrent in and of itself.

That said, I think Nunn-Lugar-Domenici must be sustained through the out years. Funding is absolutely critical. I would also argue that it must remain within the Department of Defense, as our executive agent.