CQ HOMELAND SECURITY

The Saudi monarchy’s de-radicalization program is paying dividends within its borders and could be a model for other Muslim countries, says a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Another scholar, though, from Penn State University’s International Center for the Study of Terrorism, says there is little hard evidence to suggest that such programs work.

Speaking at a George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute forum Thursday, Chris Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment described what he called the program’s “very positive and very intriguing results.”

So far, 3,000 subjects have been through the program and slightly fewer than half of these have been released into the general population. Only about 35 have been re-arrested, a recidivism rate of about 1 to 2 percent. Counting those who don’t want to participate or don’t complete the program, the Saudi government places the success rate at 80 to 90 percent.

The monarchy’s de-radicalization efforts, however, are only part of the Saudi puzzle; compared to its counter-radicalization efforts, the kingdom’s attempts to overhaul its education system — often criticized for espousing extremism and hatred for other religions — have met with less support within the government and run up against hard-liners in the education ministry, Boucek said.

In addition, the de-radicalization program is only four years old, perhaps too new for meaningful statistical conclusions. But, at least on the surface, signs of the government’s war of ideas are everywhere. Billboards juxtaposing images of Muslim piety with scenes of carnage read, “We all say no to terrorism,” gory photographs of the aftermath of terrorist attacks stare out from the pages of newspapers; and instead of saying no to drugs, students are taught to think about the consequences of violence.

And in a kingdom where obedience to authority is a prime virtue, the government’s soft approach melds nicely with the prevailing interpretation of Islam, Wahhabism, a fundamentalist denomination that stresses obedience to authority: The subjects have been misled by those who promote a perverted interpretation of Islam, and they simply need to view things correctly, the Saudi way.

The object is to get participants to renounce terrorist ideologies, especially the doctrine of takfir, or declaring Muslims apostates, a status the often precedes murderous acts.

The Ministry of Interior, which is in charge of national security, runs the program. It performs counseling and provides social support for families of the program’s subjects through committees made up of sociologists, psychologists and statisticians.

These members have performed extensive research on those who become offenders and found, for example, that an effective way to reach these young Saudi men was through Friday prayers. Offenders who did not commit violence typically did not have a complete understanding of Islam, according to program officials, or much religious training growing up; critically, this allows the Saudi state to assert its religious authority for the purpose of dissuasion. In addition, the subjects usually were young, and came from lower- to middle-class families with poorly educated parents. About a third had traveled to other countries to wage jihad, about a quarter had criminal histories.

The program also encourages the participation of other ministries, including those responsible for Islamic affairs, education, culture, labor, and social affairs — in other words, schools, mosques, mass media and social services — stressing multifaceted solutions to the complex problem of waging war on extremist ideology.

As other nations pick up on the strategy, the importance of understanding the effort, and counter-radicalization broadly, is increasing in relevance, Boucek argues in a new report. In the last several years, for example, de-radicalization programs have spread to Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, often using the Saudi program as a model.

Others say the programs are of limited value.

John Horigan, director of the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State University, has written two books on de-radicalization. “Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement,” coming out in November, and “Walking Away from Terrorism,” scheduled for February release, show the preliminary results of de-radicalization studies and compiles interviews with former terrorists, respectively.

Horigan worries that the de-radicalization programs have become a quick fix, despite a lack of evidence that they work.

For example, although the Saudis estimate an 80 to 90 percent success rate, their program limits incentives for participation from violent offenders, such as early release from prison; most participants, therefore, are not the hardened terrorist types who are likely to commit violent acts.

Horigan’s center does work for the Department of Homeland Security in this area and is conducting a major study of de-radicalization programs around the world. The preliminary results show very little de-radicalization is taking place, he said. Most of those who leave terrorist movements or are released from prisons after serving terrorism-related sentences retain the same views and aims but move on to nonviolent areas of activity — fundraising, for example.

In addition, the terrorists are basically learning to talk the talk, Horigan said. “They’re learning the kinds of things you say to get an early release back into the community” — a problem similar to what is encountered by criminal psychologists in dealing with sex offenders, he said. Several individuals thought to be success stories have re-engaged with terrorist movements.

“We have very, very, very little evidence to suggest that these programs work in the ways that are being claimed,” Horigan said.

What is needed to make a definitive determination on the efficacy of the programs is an extensive post-release follow up, pulling information from law-enforcement and intelligence agencies and the social networks to which these young men return.

“Very often a lot of the guys I’ve been interviewing change roles, so does it make sense to say they are de-radicalized? Of course not.” Horigan said. “The nature of their involvement has changed, but to say they are de-radicalized is absolute nonsense.”

“We need to be very, very cautious about the kinds of claims of success in these programs,” he continued. “Until we subject them to rigorous scrutiny, I would be deeply skeptical about the claims for success.”

Matt Korade can be reached at mkorade@cq.com.