Ambassadors Roundtable
July 23, 2008
--
Summary
As part of the Ambassador Roundtable Series on International Collaboration to Combat Terrorism and Insurgencies, The Homeland Security Policy Institute hosted Ambassador Samir Sumaida’ie of Iraq on July 23, 2008.
Since the invasion of Iraq by U.S. and coalition forces in 2003, and the resulting scourge of insurgency, Iraq has struggled through what Ambassador Sumaida’ie termed “its darkest days.” Though its society was besieged and threatened, Iraq’s social cohesion did not break down and has now “turned the corner” necessary to defeat the insurgency. In his remarks and the discussion following, the ambassador outlined the context of the current insurgency, its underlying causes and solutions arising from within Iraqi society that have occurred over the past two years.
Ambassador Sumaida’ie noted that at the crux of the struggle within Iraq are two competing ideologies—that of individual choice and freedom, or that of intimidation and submission to those who would deny individual freedom. Unless Iraq and the coalition forces understand these two philosophies and the minds of those who would usurp the power of the state of Iraq, they will not be defeated. Moreover, this is the foundation of the monumental struggle that is going on worldwide—whether on the border of Pakistan or covertly in Western Europe. As Homeland Security Policy Institute Director Frank Cilluffo stated, “We are fighting an ideology, and need to recalibrate our thinking past the kinetic fight. We need to address the underlying issue.”
Iraq became susceptible to the ideologies of groups such as al-Qa’ida when the security vacuum following the collapse of the state was not filled. As the fabric of society frayed, the environment ripened for these extremist groups to thrive—they offered a promise of safety, security and welfare. Elements of Iraqi society recruited as foot soldiers for these organizations have little in the way of education and job prospects, and thus are ready to die. Further breakdown in law and order resulted in violence and terrorism becoming prevalent as counter-movements fought for supremacy. Al-Qa’ida, Jaysh al Mahdi, and others were determined, organized, well-funded and able to wreak havoc on Iraqi society. However, it is Iraqis that have the hope of investment in their future and families that are opposed to the extremists, and which ultimately rejected these groups.
Going forward, Ambassador Sumaida’ie explained that the government of Iraq will exploit lessons it has learned. For example, most reports of terrorist activity occur at the local law enforcement level. This highlights the need to continue rebuilding of the Iraqi National Police, which contains personnel from and serves the local community. Iraq has also taken diplomatic initiative with its neighbors to prevent measures that would further exacerbate instability within Iraq. Additionally, the government is increasing the number of people it employs. Employment in turn provides an avenue to build infrastructure that will create a high quality of life that is sustainable, as well as more security as recruits to extremist organizations decrease and goods and services are restored to more of the Iraqi population. These tools of statecraft—such as policing and security, diplomacy and good governance—are paramount for success in Iraq.
According to the ambassador, these measures will enable the Iraqi people to have a vested interest in stability, and thus will support the state. It is those who have no stake in stability, or who have been on the receiving end of social injustice, that are taken by the ideologies of al Qa’ida and other extremists. The recruiters have honed in on these people to promise them subsistence, meaning and relevance—Iraq needs to build up equal skills to recruit these people back to the state and mainstream society, beginning with addressing their fundamental needs.
Finally, Ambassador Sumaida’ie had words of wisdom for U.S. leaders: “The U.S. has had some influence on the political evolution of Iraq, but unfortunately that was not always based on sufficient understanding of the local situation.” In other words, policymakers should have an understanding of the complexities of the areas they are working in as they work to defeat terrorism or create counterinsurgency programs. He believes, however, that in the end, the defeat of al Qa’ida in Iraq is the genesis of its defeat worldwide, noting that “al Qa’ida has an ideology of oppression and darkness, and it will not succeed.”
Resources
As part of the July 23th, 2008 Roundtable with Ambassador Samir Sumaida’ie, the Homeland Security Policy Institute prepared a resource page where you will find some useful links to recent reports, relevant government agencies and other relevant information.
Reports:
“Iraq Index: Tracking Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Brookings Institution (Current)
The Iraq Index is a statistical compilation of economic, public opinion, and security data. This resource provides updated information on various criteria, including crime, telephone and water service, troop fatalities, unemployment, Iraqi security forces, oil production, and coalition troop strength. The index is designed to quantify the rebuilding efforts and offer an objective set of criteria for benchmarking performance, and is based primarily on U.S. government information.
“Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon,” International Crisis Group (July 10, 2008)
A refugee crisis was feared before the coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003, but it came later than anticipated, and on a greater scale. While exact numbers are uncertain, the scale of the problem is not in dispute: today, Iraq’s refugee crisis – with some two and a half million outside the country and the same number internally displaced – ranks as the world’s second in terms of numbers. While the security situation in Iraq shows progress, the refugee crisis will endure for some time and could worsen if that progress proves fleeting. In managing the problem of the refugee wave that has washed over Jordan, Syria and (to a far lesser extent) Lebanon, the international community and the Iraq government have failed in their responsibilities. Recent improvements in Iraq’s security situation could lead some to lower their interest in the refugee question on the assumption that massive returns are imminent. This would be wrong.
“The Iraq War: Key Trends and Developments,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (July 9, 2008)
This briefing is an attempt to summarize key maps, trends, and recent polling data on Iraq. It draws heavily on official sources and the reader should clearly recognize that much of the data are selected to portray a favorable view of the war. The Iraqi War is also volatile and time sensitive. The briefing does, however, attempt to provide perspective in some areas, particularly in assessing the strength and weakness of the “surge,” by providing polling data, by projecting war costs, and by showing the limits to the US aid process.
“Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed,” Government Accountability Office (June 23, 2008)
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $640 billion for the global war on terrorism, the majority of this for operations in Iraq. In January 2007, the President announced The New Way Forward to stem violence in Iraq and enable the Iraqi government to foster national reconciliation. This new strategy established goals and objectives to achieve over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008. GAO recommends that the Departments of Defense and State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself.
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” Department of Defense (June 13, 2008)
This report includes specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic and security stability in Iraq. This is the twelfth in a series of quarterly reports on this subject. Washington’s strategic goal in Iraq remains a unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, with all major violence indicators reduced between 40 to 80% from pre-surge levels. The security, political and economic trends in Iraq continue to be positive; however, they remain fragile, reversible and uneven. Recent events have generated new challenges and opportunities for the future. As in the past, continued progress will require Iraqi leaders to take additional selfless and nationally-oriented actions in the spirit of reconciliation and compromise if Iraq is to achieve its potential as a stable, secure, multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian democracy under the rule of law.
“After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq,” RAND Corporation (June 8, 2008)
Major combat operations in Iraq lasted approximately three weeks, but stabilization efforts in that country are ongoing. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are increasingly taxed by the demands of the continuing insurgency, with more than 100,000 troops expected to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future. The evidence suggests that the United States had neither the people nor the plans in place to handle the situation that arose after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Why was the United States so unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq? As part of a larger study, RAND Arroyo Center examined prewar planning for postwar Iraq and the subsequent occupation to seek an answer to this question and to draw lessons and recommendations from the Iraq experience.
“America and the Emerging Iraqi Reality: New Goals, No Illusions,” The Century Foundation (June 8, 2008)
It is time for a new policy in Iraq, to recalibrate America’s equities and engagement there. The American people and their political leaders need to be thinking more boldly about a new horizon: Where do we want U.S.-Iraq relations to be in five years? Where does Iraq fit in America’s strategic interests and agenda? This report argues that the United States has to set its strategic goals in the region independently of how Iraq’s political dramas play out. The time for social engineering is over; events in Iraq will be determined by powerful currents within Iraqi society and politics that are less and less susceptible to outside manipulation or influence. So the United States needs to set its own course, and no longer pin its policy on the ability of the Iraqis to play a part Americans have written for them.
“Shaping the Iraq Inheritance,” Center for a New American Security (June 8, 2008)
American policy in Iraq will undergo two critical transitions in the months ahead: movement to a new U.S. posture in Iraq; and a wartime transition to a new administration. It is vital that both are handled in a way that best advances U.S. interests in Iraq and the region. Yet neither is being paid sufficient attention. America’s goals in Iraq need to be balanced with and assessed against other interests in the region and around the world. A policy of conditional engagement offers the best chance of producing lasting progress in Iraq.
“Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks,” Congressional Research Service (June 5, 2008)
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, but during 2004-2007 much of Iraq was wracked by violence caused by Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq’s government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. The Administration is claiming success in reversing the deterioration in security, attributing the gains to a “troop surge” strategy. The Administration argues that Iraqi legislative action since the beginning of 2008 represents a substantial measure of the progress on political reconciliation that was envisioned by the surge, but critics differ with the degree of such political progress and say that security gains are tenuous. Some in Congress believe that the progress is modest and unsustainable without high levels of U.S. forces, and that winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq would compel Iraqi leaders to reach needed political compromises.
“Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security,” Congressional Research Service (June 4, 2008)
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, but during 2004-2007 much of Iraq was wracked by violence caused by Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq’s government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. The Administration is claiming success in reversing the deterioration in security, attributing the gains to a “troop surge” strategy. The Administration argues that Iraqi legislative action since the beginning of 2008 represents a substantial measure of the progress on political reconciliation that was envisioned by the surge, but critics differ with the degree of such political progress and say that security gains are tenuous. Some in Congress believe that the progress is modest and unsustainable without high levels of U.S. forces, and that winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq would compel Iraqi leaders to reach needed political compromises.
“Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance,” Congressional Research Service (May 22, 2008)
A large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq since mid-2003. A significant number of reconstruction activities on the ground are completed or ongoing, but security concerns have slowed progress and added considerable expense to these efforts. Reconstruction priorities have changed over time. Currently, most large-scale infrastructure programs are no longer funded; however, many small-scale, targeted community level infrastructure efforts are funded under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the Economic Support Fund. The key emphases of the aid program are the training of Iraqi forces and programs assisting the development of Iraqi governing capacities and supporting the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
“Defense Contracting in Iraq: Issues and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (May 21, 2008)
This report examines logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq primarily administered through the U.S. Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. It is an initiative designed to manage the use of civilian contractors that perform services during times of war and other military mobilizations. It also provides for the awarding of contingency, or bridging contracts, as well as the inclusion of contingency clauses in peacetime contracts.
“Iraqi Force Development 2008,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 8, 2008)
The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) remain very much a work in progress, and Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) reporting continues to sharply exaggerate the real-world readiness of Iraqi Army units, and the ability of the ISF to takeover security responsibility in given governorates. Congress and outside observers, however, need to recognize that very real progress is being made and that the exaggerations and flaws in MNF-I and US government reporting do not mean that the ISF cannot steadily reduce the need for U.S. and allied forces over time. The development of the ISF faces a number of uncertainties.
“U.S. Forces in Iraq,” Congressional Research Service (May 8, 2008)
Varying media estimates of military forces in Iraq have raised concerns about the actual number of troops deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Last year, a major announcement on a surge in troop deployments to Iraq by President Bush included a planned gradual increase of more than 20,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Baghdad and Anbar province over several months. This report provides solely Department of Defense (DOD) statistical information on U.S. forces serving in Iraq. It also provides brief official information on the military units scheduled for the next rotation of duty into Iraq. As of April 1, 2008, according to DOD, the United States had 162,400 troops stationed in Iraq — 134,500 active component and 27,900 National Guard or Reserves. For security reasons, DOD does not routinely report the composition, size, or specific destination of military forces deployed to the Persian Gulf.
"Country Reports on Terrorism: Chapter 2– Middle East and North Africa Overview," State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (April 30, 2008)
This report on terrorist activity in 2007 produced annually notes Iraq remained at the center of the “War on Terror” battling al-Qa’ida in Iraq and affiliated terrorist organizations, insurgent groups fighting against Coalition Forces, militias and death squads engaged in sectarian as well as intra-communal violence, and criminal organizations. The report also notes the Iraqi government, in coordination with the Coalition, made significant progress in combating AQI and affiliated terrorist organizations. There was a notable reduction in the number of security incidents throughout much of Iraq, including a decrease in civilian casualties, enemy attacks, and improvised explosive devices attacks in the last quarter of the year.
“Iraq after the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape,” International Crisis Group (April 30, 2008)
Against the odds, the U.S. military surge contributed to a significant reduction in violence in Iraq. Its achievements should not be understated. But in the absence of the fundamental political changes in Iraq the surge was meant to facilitate, its successes will remain insufficient, fragile and reversible. The ever-more relative lull is an opportunity for the U.S. to focus on two missing ingredients: pressuring the Iraqi government to take long overdue steps toward political compromise and altering the regional climate so that Iraq’s neighbors use their leverage to encourage that compromise and make it stick. The surge clearly has contributed to a series of notable successes. But the question is: Now what?
“Iraq after the Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” International Crisis Group (April 30, 2008)
The U.S. military surge has contributed to a significant reduction in violence in Iraq. But in the absence of the fundamental political changes the surge was meant to facilitate, its successes will remain insufficient, fragile and reversible. Without an overarching strategy for Iraq and the region, these tactical victories due in part to the surge cannot turn into lasting success. For the first four years of the war, the U.S. administration pursued a lofty strategy – the spread of democracy; Iraq as a regional model – detached from any realistic tactics. The risk today is that, having finally adopted a set of smart, pragmatic tactics, it finds itself devoid of any overarching strategy.
“Iraq and Al Qaeda,” Congressional Research Service (April 28, 2008)
In explaining the decision to invade Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein from power, the Bush Administration asserted, among other justifications, that the regime of Saddam Hussein had a working relationship with the Al Qaeda organization. Critics maintain that subsequent research demonstrates that the relationship, if it existed, was not “operational,” and that no hard data has come to light indicating the two entities conducted any joint terrorist attacks. There have been indications that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) is attempting to conduct activities outside Iraq in a process that some describe as “spillover” from Iraq into the broader Middle East. The Al Qaeda - AQ-I relationship remains unclear and a subject of debate among experts.
“Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities,” Congressional Research Service (April 7, 2008)
For centuries the social and political organization of many Iraqi Arabs has centered on the tribe. Socially, tribes were divided into related sub-tribes, which further divided into clans, and then into extended families. Seventy-five percent of Iraq’s estimated 26 million people are a member of a tribe. They are more strongly bound by these tribal ties and a strict honor code than by ethnic background or religion. This report describes the political orientation of several Iraqi Arab tribes, including the Shammar, Dulaym, and Jibur tribes.
“Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service (April 4, 2008)
Iraq’s neighbors have influenced events in Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, and developments in Iraq have had political, economic, and security implications for Iraq’s neighbors and the broader Middle East. Understanding regional perspectives on Iraq and the potential nature and likelihood of regional responses to various scenarios will be essential for Members of the 110th Congress as they consider the future of U.S. policy. This report provides information about the current perspectives and policies of Iraq’s neighbors; analyzes potential regional responses to continued insurgency, sectarian and ethnic violence, and long-term stabilization; discusses shared concerns and U.S. long-term regional interests; and reviews U.S. policy options for responding to various contingencies.
“Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments,” Government Accountability Office (March 11, 2008)
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $700 billion for the global war on terrorism. The majority of these funds have supported U.S. efforts in Iraq. This testimony addresses (1) factors contributing to poor contracting outcomes and accountability, (2) long-standing issues in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces, and (3) efforts to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government. To improve accountability and minimize opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse, GAO has previously recommended that DOD adopt sound business processes and improve management and oversight of contractors. GAO has recommended that U.S. agencies work with the Iraqi government to develop strategic plans for key sectors.
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” Department of Defense (March 7, 2008)
This report includes specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq, as directed in that legislation. This is the eleventh in a series of quarterly reports on this subject. The strategic goal of the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, supported by limited but important gains on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts. Violence levels have declined since the last report and Iraqi Security Forces are gradually assuming responsibility for maintaining law and order and promoting stability. However, these security gains cannot be taken for granted. Sustained improvements in security will remain linked to political and economic progress. Further progress will depend on the continued ability of Iraqi leaders to capitalize on the hard-fought gains achieved by the Coalition and Iraqi forces and other courageous members of Iraqi society who are dedicated to peace.
Articles:
“Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism,” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (July 2008)
This article argues that the problems facing Iraq could have tremendous consequences for the broader "war on terror," particularly if they return to or exceed levels seen at the height of the violence in 2006. Salafi militants, followers of an extreme interpretation of Islam who want to use violence to unite Muslims under religious rule, have been fighting in Iraq and may use the country as a base for operations and attacks elsewhere in the region. In addition, refugees from Iraq might spread terrorism, radicalize neighboring populations, and contribute to strife and instability throughout the region. While a U.S. troop withdrawal may inspire fewer young men to take up terrorism against the United States, it would also increase militants' operational freedom in Iraq itself, allowing terrorist groups to recruit, train, and plan with relative impunity.
“The Imbalance in Iraqi Security Force Transition,” Scott S. Jensen, Joint Forces Quarterly (3rd Quarter 2008)
The author reviews the current status and process for the eventual completion of security responsibility from Coalition forces to Iraq, warning that “[u]nderstandably, a lag will exist between the point when Iraqi ground forces are capable of independent operations and the time that Iraqi aviation forces are capable of conducting independent operations. Current practices, however, are not adequate to ensure a proper balance between the transitions of both forces. If not corrected, this imbalance has the potential for severe consequences.”
“ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater,” Raymond T. Odierno, Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastracchio, Joint Forces Quarterly (3rd Quarter 2008)
The current environment in Iraq is complex and consists of four interacting conflicts: counteroccupation, terrorism, insurgency, and a communal struggle for power and survival. All are occurring in the context of a fragile state. Each of these four conflicts is in a different stage, depending on which part of Iraq is being considered, and solving only one of these problems in isolation tends to make the others worse. As the corps manages simultaneous, multidivision operations fighting a full spectrum, decentralized counterinsurgency across multiple, disparate operating environments, [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)] does not always lend itself to “streamlining.” The nature of the conflict makes it apparent that no single approach to ISR management will apply effectively. To gain understanding and provide the battlespace owners at all echelons situational awareness, ISR must be robust and dynamic and controlled at the right headquarters in order to get commanders the information and intelligence needed to make decisions on a decentralized COIN battlefield.
“The determinants of a US drawdown,” Michael Eisenstadt, bitterlemons-international.org (June 19, 2008)
The author outlines the potential dangers of a quick draw down of U.S. military forces in Iraq, while identifying current patterns of reduction in forces that may predict what a smaller U.S. presence may look like in the coming years of a new administration. He concludes by explaining that a United Nations resolution may be in order to expedite the process in a way that preserves some semblance of order.
“Iraq: Will We Ever Get Out?” Thomas Powers, The New York Review of Books (May 29, 2008)
In discussing several new books regarding security concerns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the author notes a working assumption among Americans that a new president will enter the White House free of responsibility for the errors of the past, free to set a new course in any program or policy, and therefore free—at the very least in constitutional theory, and perhaps even really and truly free—to call off a war begun by a predecessor. He notes however that the U.S. is not ready to leave Iraq. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, American allies are in trouble. The pride of American arms is at stake. The world is watching. Unless something quite unexpected happens, four years from now the presidential candidates will be arguing about two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, one going into its ninth year, the other into its eleventh. The choice will be the one Americans hate most—get out or fight on.
“Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Michael Knights and Eamon McCarthy, Washington Institute for Near East Policy (April 2008)
This article highlights the challenges and options facing Iraqi decisionmakers on the issue of decentralization. In explaining how subnational governance works in Iraq, the authors assess the wide range of factors in play at the local and federal levels, from the "Concerned Local Citizens" and "Awakening" movements emerging in various provinces to uncertain legislative initiatives in Baghdad. They also discuss the international community's role in strengthening the government's capacities at the local level without making the country too reliant on foreign assistance.
“As Iraqis See It,” Michael Massing, The New York Review of Books (January 17, 2008)
In a recent survey conducted by the Project for Excellence in Journalism of the Pew Research Center, US journalists in Iraq were asked to grade different aspects of reporting on the occupation. Their highest marks were given to the coverage of the military operations and experiences of US troops. Their lowest marks went to the reporting on the lives of ordinary Iraqis. This article focuses on what Iraqis themselves think about the current American led war. The question on their is whether the Americans should stay or go. While withdrawal would probably result in a bloodletting among Iraqis, they believe the country would be better off if this happened sooner rather than later, thus avoiding the effects of a prolonged occupation. Others think the Americans should stay and fix all the destruction they've caused over the last four and a half years. Whichever side they come down on, however, there is one feeling that predominates: humiliation.
News and Resource Links:
BBC Country Profile: Iraq
CIA World Factbook: Iraq
Library of Congress: Iraq
State Department: Iraq
Ambassador Samir Sumaida’ie
H.E. Samir Sumaida'ie was appointed Iraq’s Ambassador to the United States of America in April 2006. Prior to his appointment Ambassador Sumaida'ie served as Permanent Representative to the United Nations from July 2004 - April 2006. Prior to that Ambassador Sumaida'ie served as the Minister of Interior in Baghdad. In this capacity he managed a domestic security force of over 120,000 and made considerable progress in reorganizing and modernizing the Ministry’s operations. In addition, Ambassador Sumaida'ie served as a member of Governing Council (GC) in Iraq. In the GC, he was Chairman of the Media Committee. He played an integral role in the founding of the Iraqi Telecoms and Media Commission and the Public Broadcasting Institution. He also held positions on the Security, Finance, and Foreign Relations Committees. Prior to the removal of the Baathist regime, Ambassador Sumaida'ie was actively involved in opposition efforts in the United Kingdom and attended a number of high-level conferences throughout the world. As founding member of the Association of Iraqi Democrats and the Democratic Party of Iraq, he is widely renowned as an expert on the political climate in Iraq. A successful businessman, Ambassador Sumaida'ie founded a procurement agency in 1978 and has embarked on a number of entrepreneurial ventures in his career. In the 1980s Ambassador Sumaida'ie established a design office in London, pioneered the use of computers in Islamic art and completed important works in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. Most recently he served as Co-Founder and Managing Director of China Business International, an investment consultancy and procurement company based in Beijing. Ambassador Sumaida'ie was born in Baghdad and resided there until 1960. He graduated from Durham University in the United Kingdom with a degree in Electrical Engineering in 1965. He then returned to Iraq to work with the Baghdad Electricity Board and Iraqi Petroleum Company before leaving the country in 1973. Ambassador Sumaida'ie is married and has five children, all of whom currently reside in the United Kingdom. He enjoys a wide range of cultural activities, including writing poetry and crafting designs in the Islamic decorative medium.
--
The Ambassadors Roundtable Series is designed to provide Ambassadors to the United States and their key diplomatic staff with a forum to discuss current and future counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts on a regional or country-specific basis. In an effort to draw upon various insights and experiences, the Ambassadors Roundtable Series builds upon and institutionalizes efforts over the past two years to engage in a dialogue with members of the international community, policy makers, and practitioners.
